In architecture, the concept of Critical Regionalism gained popularity as a synthesis of universal, “modern” elements and individualistic elements derived from local cultures. Being introduced in the early 1980s by Alexander Tzonis, Liane Lefaivre, and Kenneth Frampton, the idea to produce buildings that are modern without neglecting contextual elements like scenery and historical references, has not only produced interesting architectural creations but also spawned a whole range of new theoretical reflections on alternatives to a universalist order or consumerist iconography that Critical Regionalists perceive as oppressive. Critical Regionalist alternatives are more than a postmodern mix of ethno styles but integrate conceptual qualities like local light, perspective, and tectonic quality into a modern architectural framework.

In order to “critically” root architectural works in their corresponding traditions, Critical Regionalists base their conceptual stances on those philosophers that have produced a critical consciousness in European culture like Kant, Ranke, Niebuhr, Humboldt, and others. It must appear as surprising that philosophy, the field from which architectural Critical Regionalism extracted its theoretical foundations, has never developed its own Critical Regionalist tradition. While philosophical evaluations of architecture and its rootedness in a regional context are thriving, few attempts have been made to apply the same kind of critical perception to regional elements in philosophy. Our own project from 2006, called Re-ethnicizing the Minds?, appears like one of such rare attempts, leading to an anthology of new articles by contributors from four different continents examining the philosophical possibilities of a critical engagement with one’s own particularity and its potential status within its respective philosophical traditions. In Re-ethnicizing the Minds? we stated that “talking about the ‘ethnic’ aspect of philosophy still contains a great deal of the challenge it had around the 1800s: it still means reconciling enlightenment with regional tradition” (19). The present article attempts to
formulate the relationship between regionalism and philosophy in a different fashion: is it possible and useful to retrospectively use the philosophical insights gained by architectural Critical Regionalism for a definition of the practice of regionalism in contemporary philosophy?

The Present Situation
A search for “World Philosophy” in library catalogues shows that this genre is mostly limited to the superficial knowledge of some classics like the *Upanishads* and the *Analects* but that it rarely represents a coordinated field of philosophical research. The coverage of World Philosophy remains grotesquely sporadic and unsystematic. First, there is no consensus about the coordination of traditional and modern elements. While, for example, in university libraries Japanese philosophy is represented by the Kyoto School and similar Western style Japanese philosophies, “Korean philosophy” is mainly present in the form of historical studies of Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. Further, the definition of “traditional” is unclear to the extent that in Africa it refers to thought preceding the influence of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian religions while in other places of the world Islamic, Jewish, and Christian philosophies are considered as “traditional.” Third, the sense of “tradition” in relationship with a geographical location is extremely loosely defined: by “Australian philosophy” is most probably meant the work of a group of analytical philosophers who happen to live in Australia. A similar situation applies to “Scandinavian philosophy.”¹ These and similar contradictions need to be disentangled through a critical analysis of philosophy in terms of regionalist expressions.

What is World Philosophy?
The contradictions cannot be leveled out through the multiplication of “national liberation” movements either. Philosophical national liberation movements like the Russian Eurasian movement formed around Alexandr Dugin (see Epstein 2006 and Kullberg 2001) or Hindu “Vedic Science” (see Nanda 2003) are not serious academic philosophies but come closer to totalitarian manifestations of backward-looking cultural nationalism. “Ethnophilosophy,” which developed in Africa in the 1960s, has been rightfully dismissed by many African philosophers for its lack of critical input.² Ethnophilosophy’s uncritical insistence on “ethnicity,” erasing all formulations of internal pluralism or historically conditioned complexities within one ethnic group, necessarily also denies the possibility of dynamic
regional interaction of different collective systems of beliefs. However, it would be absurd to accuse ethnophilosophy of its ethnic tendencies and label it as racist. It is rather the monopolizing tendencies of certain Western philosophies within the world philosophical situation that have pushed African philosophy into the niche of exclusive ethnicity. And it might push other philosophies into similar niches as I will show below.

Comparative Philosophy, or the more recent Intercultural Philosophy, though working within the margins of the academic discipline, seem to be the only branches eager to undertake a critical evaluation of World Philosophy on a comparative basis. However, also they have so far been unable to coordinate different regionalist attempts with the help of a more comprehensive theory. In the long run, Comparative philosophy cannot limit itself to the random comparison of different traditions but must engage in the coordination of individual philosophical items by establishing the meaning they can have within a general system of World Philosophy. When Wiredu explains, for example, that the Akan word for ‘truth’ \( \text{(sa\textit{a})} \) means both ‘is true’ and ‘is so’ (Wiredu 1996: 107), this individual statement about Akan truth remains meaningful to the Akans but has, so far, no purpose to fulfill in the world-philosophical context. A shift from Comparative Philosophy to World Philosophy can only be effectuated through the establishment of meaningful contexts, by contrasting and interlinking different concepts, and by providing new insights into topics that concern every human being. “Seeing life through the conceptual lenses of others can increase the depth and enrich the breadth of our conceptual scheme,” writes Lee Brown, concluding that “such growth fosters the development of wisdom” (2004: 7). A meaningful World Philosophy cannot be obtained through mere exchange of information but requires deep understanding of different traditions plus a modern mind able to conceptualize different regional ideas so that they become understandable for a general philosophical public. Only then will critical regionalist philosophy be able to do what Houtondji demanded more than thirty years ago from African philosophy: to “freely seiz[e] the whole existing philosophical and scientific heritage [and to] assimilat[e] and master it in order to be able to transcend it” (Houtondji 1976: 129).

The New Regionalism
Philosophy’s relative abstinence from critical reflections on its own status as a regional cultural expression surprises once one considers that, at present, regional identities are gaining new energy all over the world. In
the postindustrial world, regional identities are no longer linked to nationalism but seem to have “outlived the dual process of nation-building and globalization” (Umbach & Hüppauf 2005: 7). As a consequence, regionalism adopts an increasingly relational character, putting forward the theoretical potential that has always been intrinsic to the idea of the region: “The boundaries of a region never have the juridical, insulating force of other kinds of governmental divisions. Regions never have flags,” writes Douglas Reichert Powell (2007: 4).

Regions are no isolated spaces, and any reflection on regionalism acquires an inter-regional dimension. The dramatic increase of communication technology linking regional cultures among each other has made the perception of regionalism as a self-enclosing movement indulging in the cozy blindness of a random locality impossible. The multiplication of regionalisms in the world – which is certainly a consequence of globalization – represents an immense intellectual challenge because it confronts every citizen of the world with an increasingly larger range of regional cultural expressions. To be anti-regionalist today no longer denotes an opposition to narrow or even nationalist views of culture but rather the refusal to participate in the project of a hybridization of world cultures. Regionalism can no longer be seen as a reactionary attitude but represents the latest outcome of a process of modernization. This implies that contemporary regionalism be critical in order to avoid the individual’s submersion in the variety of images and impressions that are increasingly flooding the media. More than ever, regionalism forces us to adopt comparative attitudes based on a critical consciousness. Critical Regionalism is the most advanced form of modern thought because it manages to control itself on the basis of nothing other than its own “modern” and enlightened consciousness.

**Region and Reason**

Philosophy is the critical discipline par excellence as it indulges in critical self-assessment quasi from the beginning of its existence, especially when it is defined – as is often done – as a sort of ceaseless questioning. Why has philosophy not derived relevant methods from its own heritage in order to formulate a critical, self-examining, self-questioning, and self-evaluating regionalism in philosophy? One of the reasons is that, by definition, philosophy aspires towards certitudes that transcend the “relativism” of the region. “Regional or ethnic thinking contrasts with philosophical and scientific discourse in the search for the universal, that
is, for what is valid everywhere. “Aristotle conceived a philosophy aimed at universal validity, capable of getting everybody’s assent; he never tried to promote Greek thinking,” writes Crepon (1998: 253f). Also today, one of the aims of, for example, African philosophy is to exclude traditionalism as long as it is understood as “the exclusive valorization of a simplified, superficial and imaginary blueprint of cultural tradition” from its thinking (Houtondji: 162). It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that for this very reason the region – like tradition – stands only for local color, provincialism, feeling, passion, and sensibility (if not for instinct and blood).

**Historicism**

For decades, Twentieth Century Architecture followed the same patterns that are eminent in philosophy. “Since the high period of modernism in the 1950s, ‘regional’ has been a pejorative term,” writes Powell (2007: 19). However, with Critical Regionalism we observe a paradigm change in architecture and we have to ask why there has not been a similar paradigm change in philosophy. Of course, architectural critique has had a point of departure very different from that of philosophy because it could employ concepts like “the destructive power of rationalization” or the “excessive rationality of modernism” (Abel 1997: 71) with regard to architectural productions of modernism. This has no parallel in philosophy. Or has it?

Equations of regionalism with the limited judgment of particularism and localism did not only occur in the Twentieth Century but have a long tradition – as have philosophical stances that argue against it. The “critical” instance of Critical Regionalism flows out of a thematic stronghold whose ground had been laid by philosophers and historians like Barthold Niebuhr, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert. As a matter of fact, the importance attributed to critical thinking from the late 18\textsuperscript{th} to early 19\textsuperscript{th} century contributed to the formation of a critical consciousness among European architects in general as whose latest manifestation should be see Critical Regionalism. In the late 18\textsuperscript{th} to early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the critical instance occurred in the form of historicism, involving architecture as much as philosophy.

Historicism holds that cultural truths and values are not absolute but submitted to temporal and regional changes and can be grasped only as such. It is useless to derive cultural and historical truths from the point of view of essential and universal standards that one believes to be hidden in
history and culture. Every particular cultural manifestation must be critically evaluated as a case in itself. History and architecture do not follow identical natural laws that can be extracted from a bulk of random appearances. The idea that culture is based on nature is foreign to the spirit of historicism. Historicist thinkers hold that art, architecture, philosophy, and history merely rationalize social customs and institutions that vary from place to place.

Historicist worldviews introduce categories like taste and contingency into reflections on architecture, art, and also philosophy. Though their opponents have been trying to dismiss these elements as random because not being fixed by eternal laws, historicists would hold that these elements reflect the vital principle inherent in the production of culture. The historicist concept of culture and history that refused to believe in the existence of a priori principles, found a particularly strong expression in the field of historiography. Humboldt laid the ground, in his *The Idealist Theory of Historiography*, for a critical form of historicism. Historiography does more than just deal with empirical elements but the historian must reveal a general idea beneath the empirical surface of historical events. However, this general idea is not an abstract law determined by nature but it arises as a paradoxical notion. Ranke, who has often been called the father of historical science, made this clear by arguing that the works of Antiquity and the Renaissance should be used to *reconstruct* history and that preservation or the establishment of authenticity should never be an end in itself. According to Ranke, the present always organizes the past but at the same time the goals of the present will be achieved through history: “The particular is transformed by the universal, at the same time defending itself against the latter and reacting to it” (Ranke 1981: 250). The process of understanding forms a hermeneutic circle because the historian reveals the general idea beneath accidental facts *by looking at the facts* and without presupposing an a priori rule; at the same time he can understand the facts’ meaning only once he has understood the underlying general idea: “Out of the variety of individual observations the vision of their unity unconsciously arises” (122).

Ranke took a stance against the tendency to schematize history by resorting to final causes, that is, against Hegelian historical determinism, idealism, and the intention to interpret history in terms of a suprapersonal spirit or will. Instead of viewing history as a process of the self-realization of reason, Ranke interpreted history as the intentions and thoughts of
concrete individuals and institutions. His conclusion is that “only critically researched history can be regarded as history” (157) and that the “problem for the historian is not the relevance of the past period to the present, but rather the difficulty of seeing each era from an objective universal perspective” (ibid.). Philosophy’s combat against “the destructive power of rationalization” can be detected here, in the confrontation of Ranke’s hermeneutics with Hegelian determinism.

In the twentieth century, formulations of a critical consciousness that can be gained from this debate surfaced again in the form of architectural Critical Regionalist thought. Historicism’s claims about history can thus be directly transferred to discussions on the region and Humboldt’s and Ranke’s critical form of historicism can be expanded into a critical form of regionalism. The particular and the universal are interlinked and this has an effect on historical research. In 1881, Ranke, already in his late eighties, publishes his *Universal History* in which he attempts to coordinate different historical époques through a hermeneutic system. Ranke is convinced that…

Ranke’s world historical system is neither that of scholastic logical categories nor that of a Hegelian self-realization of spirit. Any “continuous movement of mankind” can be grasped neither by the simplistic belief that “every generation is more perfect than the other one” nor by determinism; instead Ranke refers to “great spiritual tendencies (…) which arise alongside one another, and which, fall into certain arranged patterns. But in these tendencies there is always one certain direction which prevails over the others and causes them to recede” (159).

The hermeneutic historian’s ambitions towards a universal system spelled out 127 years ago, has found an echo in architecture’s Critical Regionalism. The question is: why has such a hermeneutic system of World Philosophy never been created in philosophy?

**Kant**

There is another way of tracing the self-conscious, “critical” or “resistant” stance included in Critical Regionalism to the history of philosophy. The
“self-critique, which enables the architect to be both resistant and modern, to distance himself from both the Enlightenment myth of progress and the preindustrial past” (Frampton 1983b: 147) reminds one of the most famous “modern” European enlightenment projects, of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant’s critical philosophy is not a “criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason [Vernunftsgnögen]” (Kant 1911: 9/ix). Reason has here become so enlightened and so advanced, that it has finally become able to control itself through its own critical procedures.

It has been said above that Critical Regionalism is the most advanced form of modern architecture because it manages to control itself on the basis of nothing other than its own “modern” and enlightened consciousness. In this point, it clearly transgresses postmodernism, which, in its own playful fashion, did not incorporate “criticism” in its definition. While postmodernism celebrates the idea of fragmentation, provisionality, or incoherence, finally playing with extremely abstract ideas rather than with something “real,” Critical Regionalism incorporates something “earthly,” experiential, and empirical in itself because it deals with cultural elements linked to certain regions.

Also Kant found that, once reason is completely cut off from empirical data, it is unable to maintain the high altitude of its lofty intellectualism. Pure reason, “transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion” (7/vii) and is bound to crash, a fact that Kant famously described with the help of the metaphor of the dove: “The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space” (Critique of Pure Reason: 19/6). This dove is bound to crash because flying (thinking, designing) must always exercise itself against something that is empirically given. Kant overtly critiques Platonist thought because this philosophy has lost its experientially grounded roots. Kant continues:

Just in the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress (ibid).

Modernist and postmodernist architecture, just like any philosophy
that defines itself as a purely intellectual exercise, is like Kant’s proud dove. Critical Regionalism, in architecture as much as in philosophy, attempts to retrieve the cultural reality that had almost been lost in modernism as well as in postmodernism. Flying “lower” and swinging its wings against the “cultural air” that it felt had become too thin, it will still not decide to land on a vernacular ground to build its nest there. On the contrary, by using critical reason, Critical Regionalism manages to remain cultural and universal at the same time. While “regionalism” is bound to lead towards cultural particularism, in modernist internationalism culture has only a very minor role to play, and postmodernism is bound to lead towards “cultural generalism.”

Vernacular/Referential/Vehicular/Mythical
There is still another way of formulating the interplay of regional elements and rational thinking. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari divide human language into vernacular language (here), referential language (there), vehicular language (everywhere), and mythical language (beyond). In the domain of architecture this constellation can be reproduced like this: While the international style speaks the vehicular language of the everywhere, Critical Regionalism does not aim, as does “regular” regionalism, at the reinstallation of a strong vernacular “Here” but rather at the vernacularization of referential elements. While postmodernism plays with referential language, Critical Regionalism introduces vernacular elements into this play in order to invest it with something authentic. Modernism, on the other hand, even when using its postmodern extensions, cannot go further than an abstract play with the referential.

Is it possible that philosophy falls into the same trap as modernist and postmodern architecture? Will philosophy, once it loses its cultural concreteness that can only be gained through a critical confrontation with cultural environments, end up as an empty, professional game overly determined by ideological requirements of a search of neutral certitudes?

Philosophy as a Profession
In architecture, the vernacular adds a temporal dimension to its products and is therefore opposed to “the formal rationality that is indisputably modern” (Umbach & Hüppauf 21). Can parallel statements be made about philosophy? The cultural background of any philosophy represents the experiential “material” that will undergo intellectual examination and without this “material,” philosophical thought will become overly formal.
In philosophy, like in science, progress is not obtained through exactness and rigor in thinking only but also through criticism and adaptation. However, for reasons that have been stated above, in the industrialized nations’ philosophy departments, traditions and philosophy seem to be consistently separated. Kwasi Wiredu explains that the ‘advanced’ nations too have their own heritage of traditional philosophy, though, of course, they do not teach it in their philosophy departments… Nor, probably do they investigate it in their departments of sociology and anthropology, presumably being too deeply engrossed in the study of ‘primitive’ societies… (Wiredu 1980: 30-31).

It has become unavoidable to enter here into a discussion of the ethics of philosophy as a profession. Let us first ask: Who are the enemies of Critical Regionalism? In architecture the answer is easy: it is the army of technocrats and bureaucrats who plunge the profession into an impersonal anomie and atopy (cf. Tzonis & Lefaivre 1996: 489). One of the results that Critical Regionalism has obtained is the relocation of the limits of professionalism in architecture leading to the affirmation that architecture “is no more an applied science than it is a form of fine art” (2005: 197). Reflections on the vernacular as a “human-made outdoor setting not of a type usually attributed to design professionals” (Riley 130) has inspired a critical evaluation of professionalism in architecture leading to the affirmation that architectural practice “is still to be more properly regarded as a craft, one that, at its full range, is dedicated to the significant mediation of the environment” (ibid.).

A philosophy that is entirely disassociated from regional components, on the other hand, can end up as the empty professionalism that is current in many philosophy departments of industrialized but also developing countries. Cornel West speaks of his “deep suspicion of what Arthur Schopenhauer calls ‘university philosophy’ or ‘academic philosophy’ that tended to be so much concerned with abstract concepts and forms of universalizing and always in track of necessity as opposed to the concrete, the particular, the existential, the suffering beings, and the loving beings that we are and can be” (West 1998: 33). This is “academic philosophy,” which is better installed in analytical than in continental environments. The eminent African American philosopher Lewis Gordon holds that most [American] philosophy departments with Ph.D. programs consist of many
mediocre white people, who, in order to protect themselves from admitting their mediocrity, hide not only behind a welcomed veil of ignorance—usually under pompous appeals to value-neutral “objectivity”—but also behind a veil of false excellence. (...) They have an interest in mainstream philosophy’s continuing to be a boring, ahistorical, and nonpolitical enterprise (Gordon 110).

Gordon’s criticism also concerns also an “aregional” philosophy practiced in the form of a formal exercise and detached from concrete cultural expressions. One of the tasks of Critical Regionalism in philosophy can be to resist homogenizing forces in philosophy departments that still seem to swim on the wave of the professionalization of philosophy that began in the Ivy League universities between in the 1920s and 1930s (Kulka 1977: 452-53, 480), and which has been intensified, among other things, through the centralization of editorial power in the hand of large university presses of Anglophone countries. To my knowledge, it has rarely been discussed what this process of editorial “universalization on the grounds of reason” actually means for the future of philosophy. Among other things, this machine contributes to the “contempt for non-Western thinkers, who are subtly excluded from any claim to universality – that is to say to truth” (Houdondji 1976: 129). However, “not taking seriously the philosophical concerns within other cultures can severely limit the ability of Western philosophy to evolve or otherwise grow” (Brown 2004: 4). Cornel West reminds us that professionalization and specialization in higher education had first been staged as a counter-reaction to Russia’s successful ventures in space (West 1990: 24). The conspicuous rigor and scientific seriousness adopted by New Criticism, analytic philosophy, and Parsonian sociology are linked to a particular time period. If the system of centralization and over-professionalization will not be stopped, it will sooner or later push all “non-universal” philosophies into the margins of academic philosophy to the point that, one day, hermeneutics, Gadamer, or Bergson will be perceived as ethnophilosophies.

What Will a Critical Regionalist Philosophy Look Like?
Critical Regionalism deals with cultural elements linked to certain regions. At the same time, it creates a critical distance or an effect of Verfremdung (ostranenie) towards its cultural heritage, a Verfremdung that will not, as it had happened all too often in postmodernism, end up as formalist, empty play with “nothing.” Tzonis and Lefaivre put forward the Russian Formalist terms Verfremdung and “de-familiarization” (2002: 8) as the main devices supposed to determine these expressions of Critical
Regionalism, postulating like this that Critical Regionalism is as much about place as it is about displacement. Ostranenie “de-automatizes” perception and the buildings of Critical Regionalist architecture are “distant, hard to grasp, difficult, even disturbing” (1996: 489). The authors conclude that “the operations of identifying, decomposing, recomposing regional elements in a ‘defamiliarizing’ way is part of the universal set of skills of architects” (ibid.).

Can this also become a principle task of the philosopher? Can a critical play with regionalist themes de-automatize philosophical ways of rationalization that are, as Gordon claims, so much determined by academic routine? Shklovsky, in his famous essay “Art as Technique,” went as far as establishing the ostranenie as a criterion for the difference between literature and non-literature or art and non-art. Can ostranenie also be a criterion for the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy? Literature, art, and also philosophy are supposed to produce an awareness of the world that is stronger and more truthful than the “common” awareness determined by the daily routine. The main enemy of the artist is habituation, which, in Shklovsky’s original formulation, “devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (Shklovsky 1990/65: /12). According to Shklovsky, in literature, this defamiliarization is obtained through wordplay, deliberately roughened rhythm, or figures of speech. Would this agenda work for philosophy? The first sentence of Shklovsky’s famous essay is “Art is thinking in images” (58/5), an idea of the Ukrainian linguist Alexander Potebnja. However, in spite of the fervent anti-historicism that Shklovsky and all other Russian Formalists engaged in, it seems today that Shklovsky’s (though not necessarily Potebnja’s) definition of art as “thinking in images” is historicist and regionalist in exactly the sense that has been explained in the present article when he writes:

The image is not a permanent referent for those mutable complexities of life which are revealed through it, its purpose is not to make us perceive meaning, but to create a special perception of the object—it creates a “vision” (vvedenie) of the object instead of serving as a means of “knowing” (a ne uznava za) it (67/18).

Shklovsky is convinced that “poets are much more concerned with the arrangement (raspolozhenie) of images than with their creation (sozdanie)” (59/7, my italics) and that the images are received and subsequently applied within new systems.

Can a parallel with philosophy be established? Does a large part of
“philosophical thinking” not consist rather in the *arrangement* of concepts and ideas and not in their *creation*? Also philosophers process ideas and concepts that they have not necessarily invented but that have been “given” to them and they can receive concepts from all sorts of cultures. In this sense, Shklovsky’s historicist approach can serve as a blueprint for Critical Regionalist philosophy. For this philosophy, a World Philosophical model will not constitute a coherent Idealist system but rather produce *koan*-like effects of surprise by juxtaposing concepts and categories from different cultures and languages in order to produce theories of truth that will have no global significance but are still meaningful within a universal context.

**References:**


3 Intercultural philosophy “departs from the thesis that in the fields of philosophy and arts intercultural communication can happen on the level of equality” (statement of the Foundation for Intercultural Philosophy). Important works: Kimmerle & Oosterling (eds) 2000, and Wimmer 1996.
4 Quoted from Okolo 2006: 43.
5 The point has been very well made by Peter Eisenman 1995.
6 Frampton claims – without referring to Ranke or Hegel – that Critical Regionalism should abandon the modern idea of a linear stylistic evolution (1983a: 147).
7 Deleuze & Guattari 1975: 43ff. The scheme vernacular-referential-vehicular-mythical was actually first explored by Henri Gobard.