

The Role of the Criminal Intelligence Analysis in anti-terrorism

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Abstract: *Criminal intelligence, as a process, offers the law enforcement a coherent, rational, and consistent methodology in dealing with terrorism. There are several analytical techniques and products that can be utilized when dealing with terrorism. However when applying analysis in anti-terrorism efforts, the technique of providing threat assessment is critical. Criminal intelligence analysts can accomplish analysis and risk assessment through three phases: inventory phase, risk assessment phase and sharing information phase. But in order to achieve results we need law enforcement environment that views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing, rather than as supplement. This paper focuses on how to use the criminal intelligence process and certain analytic techniques in anti-terrorism activities and elaborates the implementation of the Criminal Intelligence Analysis (CIA) as the only approach to achieve an effective proactive and responsive anti-terrorism program.*

Keywords: *criminal intelligence, criminal intelligence process, criminal intelligence analysis, intelligence led-policing (ILP), anti-terrorism, threat assessment*

1. INTRODUCTION

There are many definitions of the term terrorism, however, none is universally accepted. Instead of providing a definition, for the purpose of this paper, the following is a list of common characteristics of terrorism: 1. an act or threat of violence; 2. used to create an atmosphere of fear or coercion, 3. used to further a political or social purpose. Terroristic acts differ from many other violent crimes in their complexity and planning and they often require significant financing, numbers of participants and coordination [16; 118]. Analysis is just as key in responding to terrorist acts as it is in helping prevent or deter terrorism because an actual terrorist attack is treated as a crime scene and thus the materials gathered can be analyzed to determine who perpetrated the attack and how [20; 82] but the term anti-terrorism refers to those activities that seek to prevent the execution of terrorist acts. This is different from the term counter-terrorism, which are those activities that respond to terrorist acts once they have occurred [21; 2]. The key to an effective anti-terrorism effort is intelligence; that is analyzed information. Intelligence can be perceived as a product, process and organization. Intelligence, as a process, offers the law enforcement a coherent, rational, and consistent methodology in dealing with terrorism. Intelligence is also the end product of the information, which has been subject to the intelligence process [13; 2]. The development of intelligence should not be confused with traditional investigative work [13; 5]. Although the two are related, the investigative reporting is evidentiary in nature and the intelligence reporting should be viewed as an early warning system. Intelligence, as a product of knowledge, is designed to provide foreknowledge and warning; as such, it is intended to be an integral part of government decision-making process [10; 7]. The concept of "process" over "product" is a significant issue in analysis today. Process translates into an in-depth approach to extract meaning from the fact, where a product focuses on charting and other mere reflections of the data so the way in which analysis is being done and taught should be changed to emphasize meaning [18; 1]. Generally, there are the three key stages recognized in generating intelligence: collection of raw data, carrying out analysis and generating intelligence products [3; 35] but the intelligence process in classical context consists of the five phases: planning, collection, collation, analysis and dissemination [24; 428]. Global definition of the criminal intelligence introduces the concept of a systematic approach to criminal data/information collection, collation and evaluation. The criminal intelligence process consists of

nine stages: planning, collection of information, assessment of information validity, collation of information, analysis of information, assessment of analytical rigor and value, dissemination of intelligence, application of intelligence and review and assessment of criminal intelligence project/function/unit [22; 1]. Brincka and Kopal distinguish data and information in a way that the data is formalized presentation of the facts and the findings suitable for interpreting and processing whilst information is meaning allocated to the data by using conventions for their interpretations [5; 151]. Therefore, collection of the data is to become the second phase, assessment of the data validity (data and source) is to become the third phase and collation of the data is to become the fourth phase of the intelligence process. The fight against terrorism calls for locating and measuring terrorist risks, analyzing information and using intelligence to guide operations [20; 77]. Traditionally, law enforcement organizations have focused on collecting data and storing information, sometimes ignoring the need to analyze and draw meaning from those data. But the type of work required to respond to terrorism is virtually impossible without trained intelligence analysts and this article provides direction on how to accomplish analysis and risk assessment regarding international or domestic terrorist activity.

2. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND INTELLIGENCE LED-POLICING

Gottlieb [8; 13] defines the crime analysis as a set of systematic, analytical processes directed at providing timely and pertinent information (note of author: intelligence) and Atkin [4; 2] defines the criminal intelligence as a product of criminal intelligence analysis about criminal and/or criminality. The criminal intelligence analysis (CIA) is defined as a process of data collection, manipulation, and interpretation, which integrates structured methodology with intellectual skill to extract principles and meaning, and thus generates a product, namely an enhanced view of crime and/or criminality, generally in support of a law enforcement goal [4; 3]. Peterson [17; 2] defines the object of criminal intelligence analysis as "to arrive at conclusions and make recommendations for action". Criminal intelligence analysis also enables the law enforcement managers to allocate the agency's limited resources more effectively and efficiently on the more serious criminal problems. Regarding terrorism analysis can be described as the examination of raw intelligence data that enables the analyst to uncover possible terrorism trends and provide appropriate investigative management [7; 2]. The fight against terrorism requires the current concept of the criminal intelligence analysis, which used to be tactically oriented and passive in practice so far, to be expanded to incorporate active intelligence gathering and an inter-agency, interdisciplinary approach to improve the intelligence base. An active, goal-oriented intelligence gathering has to become an integral part of day-to-day analysis in order to sustain the value of analytical results and promote the setting of appropriate priorities [23; 22-23]. But, the real problem in proactive policing is to quarantine sufficient resources to allow critical strategic intelligence projects to make progress without risk of interference from more immediate operational imperatives [11; 36] and the integration of intelligence with operations is clearly the answer to efficiently managing investigative resources [6; 55-58]. The Criminal Police Directorate, Ministry of Interior of Republic of Croatia implements intelligence led-policing (ILP) as a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations [1; 1], rather than the reverse and is predicated on the effective and efficient production and application of intelligence. The intelligence led-policing (ILP) implies that there is a need for generating intelligence and that intelligence is used to lead policing. This has to be accomplished through an environment that views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing, rather than as supplement [19; 13]. Although there are several methods and models of using intelligence to lead policing all intelligence-led policing models exhibit key common features, as the following: 1. Production of the accurate and timely analytic products and intelligence relevant to the operational goals, which describe the nature and extent of problems affecting jurisdiction of the organization. 2. The use of these analytic and intelligence products to develop and guide strategy, operational planning or any action that addresses these problems. 3. Continuing monitoring and evaluation to determine the impact of action upon the problems and ongoing

development to encompass change and/or improvement as necessary [19; 15]. In the intelligence literature writers have discussed different type of analytic or intelligence-led application in combating terrorism. Collection plans, trend analysis, telephone record analysis, bank record analysis and strategic intelligence assessments as analytical techniques and event-flow charts and association chart as products can be utilized when dealing with terrorism. However when applying analysis in anti-terrorism efforts, the technique of providing threat assessment is critical [19; 28].

3. APPLICATION OF CIA IN ANTI-TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT

Analytical techniques can be used in proactive and reactive terrorist investigations and analytical techniques utilized during proactive investigations include assessments of a group's potential threat. As a result of these threat assessments, actions may be taken to increase security for events, individuals, or places [16; 118]. The first objective intelligence should aim at, is a prediction which means to supply warning to the relevant authorities of a developing terrorist threat or to supply warning of the possibility or probability of such threat [25; 63]. A threat assessment is a strategic document that looks at a group's propensity for violence or criminality, or the possible occurrence of a criminal activity in a certain time or place [16; 56-57] and originate from military intelligence regarding product warning intelligence [12; 91]. By collecting information on various indicators, a level of threat potential of a particular group can be estimated. Threat assessments provide an informed judgment on intentions and capabilities of a terrorist group and can be used to focus investigations on those groups with the greatest propensity for violent actions. As part of threat assessments analyst have to make recommendations, which allow management to allocate resources and take necessary actions [19; 28]. Threat assessments evaluate the characteristics, analyze the risks, and measure the violence potential associated with criminal extremist or terrorist group and these assessments are used for tactical and strategic purposes by law enforcement authorities to target and neutralize the groups before they commit crimes of violence [15; 1]. Key to the investigation of terrorism is gathering, analysis and sharing of information [16; 117] so the anti-terrorism analysis can be broken into three steps: inventory, risk assessment and dissemination [20; 77]. The inventory phase combines collecting raw data with organizing and evaluating that data. The first step is that potential sources of threats must be determined and these sources may include domestic terrorist groups or international terrorist groups. Yariv [25; 66] stressed the importance of collecting information on terrorist groups or organizations through the use of a collection plan. Regarding open sources appropriate exploration should be done to determine if any recent events have occurred that might impact these groups. Once potential sources of threats are known or suspected, then the potential targets may be determined. The analyst should not ignore targets of opportunity that are targets presented by special occasions: celebrations, visits from dignitaries etc. Vulnerability assessment is another useful anti-terrorism tool but it should not be confused with threat assessment. While not aimed at a terrorist group, vulnerability assessment focus on measuring the threat potential at a certain location or event [19; 28]. The table called "Target Inventory" then should be made. In this table analysts write locations, and then looks at their vulnerability to attack, their current level of security, and the impact any attack might have.

Table 1., Target Inventory [20; 79]

Location	Probability of Attack ¹	Threat to Security ²	Impact of Attack ³	Total Scoring
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The value of the cells can be low, medium or high and the scores are then computed to determine which targets are the most vulnerable and have the highest damage potential to the community. When the possible sources and targets of threats are compiled, the potential weapons (and the

¹ Probability of attack refers to the likelihood of that location being chosen as a target.

² Threat to security refers to the probability that security at the location could be breached.

³ Impact of attack refers to the number of people who may be harmed by an attack.

vehicles that might be used to convey the weapons) that might effectively be used against these targets by the sources can be compiled. At this point a table “Group Indicator” should be done. This table shows the groups with pre-incident indicators and the groups are scored with those exhibiting the highest number of indicators receiving the highest scores.

Table 2., Group Indicator [20; 79]

Group	Threats Made	Previous Violent Acts	Criminal Activities	Funds Generated	Predicates Elsewhere	Intelligence Gathering	Weapons Buildup	Travel	Scoring
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Once appropriate material is gathered, it must be evaluated in keeping with the intelligence process, which means that the reliability of the sources and the validity of the information should be quantified. This allows the analyst to place proper value on the data and give it the appropriate weight when forecasting the potential acts to occur. Key to determining the level of threat posed by terrorist groups is assessing the magnitude of threatened harm, the likelihood of occurrence and the immediacy of the threat [14; 12]. To measure the threat level based on group evaluation characteristics, criminal predicate analysis, target analysis and the consequences of intervention we can make a threat assessment matrix with ratings of low, medium and high [14; 23]. The analyst must evaluate several characteristics to identify the existence and type of group and the following table format provides comprehensive threat assessment for each group.

Table 3., Comprehensive Threat Assessment Table [14; 19-23]

Threat Level	Group Characteristics Evaluation		Criminal Predicate Analysis		Target Analysis		Consequence of Intervention ⁴
	Ideology and Operations ⁵	Tactics and Membership ⁶	Crimes and Capability ⁷	Probability and Violence ⁸	Targets and Vulnerability ⁹	Probability and Damage ¹⁰	
Low ¹¹							
Medium ¹²							
High ¹³							

Conclusions about the probability that the threat will materialize into action along with recommendations for countermeasures must be made. These recommendations presume knowledge of the analyst of what actions are available to the law enforcement agency and feasibility of those actions [16; 57] and it is also suggested to make an analysis of the possible alternatives [9; 101]. Intelligence gaps can provide guidance for collectors and must be included in recommended actions and assessments should also state what is not known. The two possible report formats included in a typical anti-terrorism analysis are seen in Table 4.

⁴ There are adverse implications for law enforcement authorities responding to threat. The actions taken by law enforcement agencies in response to a threat will generate a reaction on the part of the terrorist group, as well as a reaction from the public and these reactions must be taken into consideration when an action is considered.

⁵ Group exists, has geographic area of activity and a ccess to targets.

⁶ Group has method of operations and a membership committed to violence in support of its goals.

⁷ Group has been involved in crime or is capable of committing crime.

⁸ Group has propensity for violent acts and states intention to commit them.

⁹ Targets are susceptible to acts of violence.

¹⁰ Targets will probably attack; damage could be significant.

¹¹ Little, or no, threat. The groups are upset but involved in little focused action other than non-violent protests. However, the groups should be continuously monitored for strategic evaluation and analysis purposes.

¹² Threat exists but does not appear imminent. The groups have focused attention and may become violent. Law enforcement authorities need to be strategically aware of the groups' crimes and prepared to tactically respond.

¹³ Threat is visible and distinctive. The groups have the destructive cause. All law enforcement precautionary measures need to be employed and tactical response plans activated.

Table 4., The two possible report formats included in a typical anti-terrorism analysis

Threat Assessment Report Format [19; 29]	Format for Intelligence Profile on Terrorist Organization [2; 204]
Executive Summary	Summary
Report	
Group Characteristics Ideology Field of Operations Tactics Membership	Identification Name and abbreviation by which the group is commonly known
Criminal Predicate Types of Crime Capability Factor Probability Factor Violence Potential	Formal name of the organization (in Croatian/English) Origins Name of the organization in native language Roots (cultural, ethnic, political, socio-economic) Historical development Groups that influenced organization and training during formative stages
Warning Signs Weapons and Explosives Cellular Structure Military-Style Training Intimidation	Terrorist Mission and Strategy Mission (definition of the organization's overall mission) Strategy (succinct statement of organization's current objective(s) for carrying out its mission)
Potential Targets Target Identification Vulnerability Probability of Attack (Threats or ideological communications received from group. Smaller incidents of disruption or disobedience that may lead up to violence. A build-up of funds, or weaponry, or membership, in the group. Evidence that the group has been planning, staging, or gathering intelligence on targets.) Damage Potential	Current Targets and Tactics Political Activities (What terrorist acts are being carried out? Who are the targets? To achieve what influence on what audience? E.g. assassinate moderate leader to intimidate others and enforce a "no-compromise-with-the-enemy" policy. Does the organization carry out terrorist missions to gain the release of its imprisoned members?) Funding Activities (Is terrorism a main source of obtaining funds for the organization? E.g. bank robberies, hijackings, kidnapping of business executives, holding hostages for ransom. What acts of violence have been carried out for this purpose?) Tactics (How do action teams move to the objective? E.g. Together? Separately? Use false passports? If so what nationality, birthplaces indicated? How do they "case" the objective area? What advance information do they appear to have? Do they conduct their own surveillance of target individuals? How do they gain access to a target installation? Do they take hostages? If so, how do they treat hostages? What are their usual demands for release of hostages?)
Consequence of Intervention	Organization and Membership Headquarters Major concentrations of members and activities Estimated number of members Pattern of organization (E.g. country or regional branches, cells, etc.) Size, nature and location of target constituency Principal leaders
Conclusion	Outside Support Ideologically related organizations (fronts) Propaganda support Logistical support (especially from terrorist organizations not related by ideological affinity) Funding support
Recommendations	Current Status of Members Imprisoned in Various Countries
	Analysis of Behavior Under Stress
	Chronology of Major Events

In general, three levels of warnings may be disseminated: advisories¹⁴, alerts¹⁵ and warnings¹⁶. Terrorist activities are often cross-jurisdictional (even cross-border) and while the local law enforcement agency may collect and analyze data, the overall scheme can only be seen at a larger level. It is imperative that a liaison role exists between local operations and involved state officers and this should be two-way information sharing. Sharing intelligence is often difficult within the territorial domain of law enforcement, but the greater goal of safety should rise above this territorialism.

4. CONCLUSION

The terroristic activities require both proactive and reactive investigation and the type of analytical products, which can be used in the investigation of terroristic activities, depend on the nature (proactive or reactive) of the investigation [16; 116-117]. Reactive terrorism investigations mirror the general investigative process, on one hand, but also benefit from the proactive assessments of the groups, which are available [16; 118]. Law enforcement must recognize and respond to terrorist groups before they have opportunity to commit violent acts and the intelligence process is an integral part of law enforcement anti-terrorism measures. Various analytical techniques and products are a part of these measures but the threat assessment tool described in this article will enable proactive investigations of terrorist groups. Trained intelligence analysts should complete threat assessments and training on intelligence and anti-terrorism should be sought. The gathering and analysis of information relating to terrorism is not a one-time effort [19; 30]. The initial data must be updated regularly and with vigilance and only through this type of commitment can we ensure that terrorist acts are prevented. The criminal intelligence analysis as a process of data collection, manipulation, and interpretation, which integrates analytical methodology with intellectual skill to generate intelligence, is the key to successful anti-terrorism efforts but it has to be accomplished in an ILP environment that views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing.

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¹⁴ Broad, general threats; no immediate action needed.

¹⁵ Cautionary information, may recommend change in posture or response.

¹⁶ Imminent or in-progress threats or attacks.

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